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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Appeal of a final order of a District Court was 
filed in the Supreme Court for the State of Utah pursuant to 
§78-2-2 (3) (i), Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended. The case 
was poured-over to the Court of Appeals for disposition pursuant 
to the power granted in §78-2-2(4). 
The lower court granted Defendant Summary Judgment, 
ruling that Plaintiffs1 claim was subject to the statute of 
frauds and unenforceable. At the hearing, Plaintiffs argued that 
the oral contract between the parties was not within the statute 
and, in the alternative, that writings sufficient to take the 
contract out of the statute existed within Defendant's control. 
Plaintiffs asked the court to defer a ruling on Defendant's 
motion pending discovery of those writings, as provided in Rule 
56(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs' request was 
denied, and Summary Judgment entered in favor of Defendant. 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the lower court err in granting Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment where Plaintiffs had alleged the 
existence of sufficient writings to take the contract out of the 
ambit of the statute of frauds but had not had the opportunity to 
pursue discovery procedures? 
2* Did the lower court err in concluding that the 
statute of frauds was applicable to the contract between 
Plaintiffs and Defendant which could be fully performed by one 
party within one year? 
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DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
§ 25-5-4(1), Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended: 
Certain Agreements void unless written 
and subscribed. In the following cases every 
agreement shall be void unless such agree-
ment, or some note or memorandum thereof, 
is in writing subscribed by the party to be 
charged therewith: 
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is 
not to be performed within one year from 
the making thereof. . . . 
Rule 56(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Should it appear from the affidavits of 
a party opposing the motion that he cannot for 
reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify his opposition, the court 
may refuse the application for judgment or may 
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery 
to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs commenced this action for damages in the 
Third Judicial District Court, alleging that Defendant had 
breached an oral contract to provide financing for Plaintiffs1 
purchase of a residence in an agreed principal sum and at an 
agreed rate of interest, (R 2-7). Defendant moved to dismiss, (R 
11-12) claiming that the oral contract was within the Statute of 
Frauds and unenforceable as a contract not to be performed within 
one year (R 15) and for which no documentation existed sufficient 
to satisfy the statute of frauds* (R 15)• 
Plaintiffs amended their complaint to allege the 
existence of a written loan application (R 25) and memoranda and 
documents evidencing Defendant's acceptance and agreement. (R 
26). In response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs 
submitted an affidavit with regard to the existence of written 
documents evidencing the loan agreement. (R 33-34). Defendant 
responded with a Memorandum and Affidavit. (R 44-58) . 
At the hearing on Defendant's Motion, Plaintiffs argued 
that (1) the oral contract to make a loan could be performed 
fully by one of the parties within one year and (2) a decision as 
to the existence of sufficient writings should be deferred until 
Plaintiffs could pursue discovery procedures. (R 73-74). 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was granted, and Plain-
tiffs appeal therefrom. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about the 15th of December 1986, Plaintiffs made 
written application to Defendant for a mortgage loan upon their 
property at 10307 South Edgecliff Drive, Sandy, Utah. (R 25). 
Defendant accepted Plaintiffs1 application and agreed 
to lock in interest at the rate of nine percent (9%) per annum 
with one (1) point, and to lend ninety percent (90%) of the 
appraised value of the property, provided that Plaintiffs met 
Defendants normal loan qualifications. Plaintiffs believe that 
the agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant was evidenced by 
various writings executed by the parties. 
Defendant approved Plaintiffs1 loan application and 
scheduled the closing of the loan for April 27, 1987. The loan 
to be closed was for the principal sum of $116,500.00 at nine 
percent (9%) for thirty (30) years, with one percent (1%) to be 
paid at the time of closing. (R 34A). Plaintiff asserts that 
documents in Defendant's file evidence the loan approval and 
scheduled closing. (R 32-34). 
In reliance upon Defendant's representation that 
closing of the loan was imminent, Plaintiffs did not pay the 
March and April payments on their pre-existing mortgage with City 
Federal Savings and Loan. On April 27, 1987, Defendant informed 
Plaintiffs that the loan would not be closed as agreed. Since 
that date, Defendant has refused to close a loan upon the terms 
and conditions agreed between the parties. 
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Plaintiffs commenced an action against Defendant on May 
14, 1987, alleging that Defendant breached the oral contract to 
close a loan to Plaintiffs on April 27, 1987. (R 2-7). Defendant 
moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint on the ground that the 
contract between the parties was within the statute of frauds and 
unenforceable. (R 11-17). Plaintiffs then amended their 
complaint and submitted an affidavit stating that writings 
sufficient to establish the contract existed within the pos-
session and control of Defendant. (R 25-40). Defendant submitted 
an affidavit denying the existence of any such documents within 
Defendant's control. (R 44-46). 
At the hearing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the 
Honorable Pat B. Brian of the Third Judicial District Court 
determined that Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
required that the Motion be treated as a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, pursuant to Rule 56(b). (R 59-60). Plaintiffs' counsel 
requested that a ruling be delayed until Plaintiffs could 
instigate discovery procedures to obtain writings within 
Defendant's possession and control. (R 73-74). 
The lower court ruled in favor of Defendant. Summary 
Judgment was entered on July 20, 1987. (R 59-60). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiffs appeal the order of the district court and 
argue that the oral contract to make a loan to Plaintiffs could 
be fully performed by one party within one year and, as a result, 
was not within the statute of frauds. 
Plaintiffs further contend that where there was an 
issue of fact as to the existence of writings sufficient to 
satisfy the statute of frauds and Plaintiffs had not yet had an 
opportunity to pursue discovery, Summary Judgment was not appro-
priate, as established by Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDMENT WHERE THERE WAS AN ISSUE OF FACT 
AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF DOCUMENTS. 
The Supreme Court for the State of Utah has clearly 
articulated the circumstances in which it is error for the trial 
court to grant summary judgment. "Summary Judgment is a 
peremptory remedy, and a trial court, in determining whether a 
material issue of fact exists for the purpose of applying Rule 
56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in a summary judgment 
procedure, must view the facts and their inferences in the light 
most favorable to the party moved against." Spor v. Crested 
Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 60 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 29 (1987), 
(quoting W. M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources Co., 627 
P.2d 56,59 (Utah 1981)). In cases involving the interpretation 
of an agreement or a document, "it is not appropriate for a court 
to weigh disputed evidence concerning such factors; the sole 
inquiry to be determined is whether there is a material issue of 
fact to be decided." Id. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure have also anticipated 
and provided for those occasions when a party raises an issue of 
fact but is prevented from presenting facts essential to justify 
that position. Rule 56(f) states as follows: 
- f t -
When Affidavits are Unavailable, Should it 
appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that he cannot for 
reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify his opposition, the 
court may refuse the application for judgment 
or may order a continuance to permit affidavits 
to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such other 
order as is just. 
Plaintiffs contend that Rule 56(f) should have been 
applied by the lower court to defer a ruling on Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss until Plaintiffs could discover the documents 
within Defendant's control and that summary judgment in favor of 
Defendant was inappropriate in the circumstances. Particular 
documents were essential to Plaintiffs' defense to Defendant's 
Motion based on the statute of frauds where the existence of 
sufficient writings to satisfy the statute was alleged by Plain-
tiff Bryan Cannon's Affidavit, (R 32-40). Plaintiffs had not 
had an opportunity, however, to obtain copies of the documents 
Plaintiffs believe exist in Defendant's files. 
The Court of Appeals of Kansas has held that summary 
judgment should not be entered where the opposing party is 
proceeding with due diligence with pretrial discovery but has not 
had an opportunity to complete it. Caplinger v. Carter, 6 76 P.2d 
1300 (Kan. App. 1984). Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court con-
sidered a trial court's grant to plaintiff of summary judgment 
where the defendant had not had an opportunity to present evi-
dence and have findings of fact. On appeal, the reviewing court 
accepted the defendants' assertions as true and stated in 
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footnote that, in view of the State Constitution's guarantee of 
access to the courts for protection of rights and redress of 
wrongs, " . . . summary judgment, which denies opportunity for 
trial, should be granted only when it clearly appears that there 
is no reasonable probability that the party moved against could 
prevail." Utah State University, Etc. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 
715, 720 (Utah 1982). 
In the case at hand, Plaintiffs had alleged by 
affidavit the existence of documents that would satisfy the 
statute of frauds and Defendant had, by affidavit, denied the 
same. Whether such documents existed was a question of fact and 
where such disputes exist, a lower court cannot weigh the 
evidence. Plaintiffs contend that the court was obligated to 
view their claims in the most favorable light and to give them 
the opportunity to present evidence upon a question of fact. In 
these circumstances, summary judgment was a denial of Plaintiffs1 
right to pursue discovery procedures and inappropriate. 
POINT II 
THE ORAL CONTRACT TO MAKE A LOAN IS NOT 
WITHIN THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that Defendant agreed to 
make them a loan to be repaid over a thirty-year period. Al-
though the agreement was oral, Plaintiffs contend that documents 
exist which would sufficiently substantiate the existence of the 
-i n-
agreement and set forth its terms to satisfy the statute of 
frauds. Notwithstanding, Plaintiffs assert that the oral 
agreement between the parties is not within the statute of frauds 
because the agreement could be performed within one year, 
A Wyoming court considered the application of the 
statute of frauds and relied upon Section 198 of the Restatement 
of the Law of Contracts, concluding that, "The words 'cannot be 
fully performed1 must be taken literally. The fact that perform-
ance within a year is highly improbable or not expected by the 
parties does not bring a contract within the statute." Hageman & 
Pond, Inc. v. Clark, 238 P.2d 919, 925 (Wyo. 1951). Apparently, 
the provision of the statute of frauds which bars action on a 
contract not to be performed within one year applies only to 
those agreements which, b^ their terms, cannot be performed 
within a year; hence, the traditional distinction between a 
contract for employment for one year from a future date, to which 
the statute applies, and a contract for employment for life, to 
which the statute does not apply. 
Utah caselaw is in accord. For example, the Utah 
Supreme Court has held that an action on an oral contract for the 
exchange of farm land and shares of water stock was not barred by 
the statute of frauds where the parties could easily have per-
formed within a year, had they seen fit to do so. Christensen v. 
Christensen, 9 Utah 2d 102, 339 P.2d 101 (1959). Furthermore, 
the general rule followed by most authorities and cited by the 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin is that in order for a 
-11-
bilateral contract to be subject to the one-year provision of the 
statute of frauds, performance by both parties must extend beyond 
one year, and not merely performance by one party. Beacon Fed. 
S.& L. Ans'n v. Panoramie Enterprises, Inc., 99 N.W.2d 696 (Wis. 
1959). 
Plaintiffs1 contract with Defendant was for a 30-year 
mortgage, but Defendant's disbursement of funds to Plaintiffs 
easily could have been performed by Defendant within one year. 
The caselaw indicates that where full performance by either party 
is easily possible within the year, the statute of frauds is not 
applicable. Defendant should not now be able to invoke the 
statute in the absence of any evidence that performance within 
one year was not possible, and in light of the Defendant's 
assurances to Plaintiffs that the closing of the loan was 
imminent. 
Once again, Plaintiff argues that the issue of the 
applicability of the statute of frauds is not appropriate for 
summary judgment. The same conclusion has been reached by the 
Utah Supreme Court in similar fact situations. For example, a 
Plaintiff appealed a summary judgment for defendant with regard 
to a loan agreement under which the defendant bank agreed to make 
advances to the plaintiff, a subcontractor, as needed and at a 
later date refused to make advances. The subcontractor sued for 
breach of a loan agreement and the bank pleaded the statute of 
frauds as a defense. On appeal of the verdict for defendant, the 
Utah Supreme Court held that whether the loan agreement could be 
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performed within a year was a question of fact, and that the 
trial court's ruling that the agreement was offensive to the 
statute as a matter of law was erroneous. The matter was remand-
ed for trial. M & S Construction & Eng. Co. v. Clearfield State 
Bank, 19 Utah 2d 86, 426 P.2d 227 (1967). Identical issues had 
been addressed in Commercial Security Bank v. Hodson, in which 
the Utah Supreme Court reversed summary judgment and held that 
the statute of frauds would not bar an action for breach of a 
loan agreement where the length of time of the loan was not 
specified but no evidence indicated that it could not be 
performed withing a year. 15 Utah 2d 388, 393 P.2d 482 (1964). 
Such issues exist in the case at hand, and Plaintiffs 
therefore request that this court reverse the lower court's grant 
of summary judgment and allow the issues to be litigated. 
CONCLUSION 
It is Plaintiffs' contention that the loan agreement 
sued upon is not subject to the statute of frauds because full 
performance by one party was to be completed within one year. 
However, Plaintiffs argue that the issue of the applicability of 
the statute of frauds to the loan agreement conceded by Defendant 
in its Motion to Dismiss turns on issues of fact inappropriate 
for summary judgment. Furthermore, Plaintiffs believe that, 
should it be determined by the court that the agreement is within 
the statute, sufficient writings exist to substantiate the 
contract and its terms. Plaintiffs appeal to the Court for a 
decision that the loan agreement was not subject to the statute 
of frauds as a matter of law, or, in the alternative, for a 
reversal of the summary judgment of the Third Judicial District 
Court to allow them to pursue discovery procedures. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
POOtfE, GANNON & SMIM 
tiJE R. sMrnr"' 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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